a b c d Gozalova, Nigar (2023). "Qajar Iran at the centre of British–Russian confrontation in the 1820s". The Maghreb Review. 48 (1): 89–99. doi: 10.1353/tmr.2023.0003. ISSN 2754-6772. S2CID 255523192. Ali Masjid and the British Camp, 1878". www.wdl.org. 5 November 1878. Archived from the original on 29 February 2020 . Retrieved 29 February 2020. It would add power and prestige to the Russian regime that was the great enemy of political freedom. On November 19, 1905 a convocation was organized by "The Union for Autonomy" in which 83 representatives participated from Azerbaizhan, Armenia, Georgia, Poland, Latvia, Ukraine, the Kazakhs, the Tatars and others from among the ethnonationally oppressed nations. In the gathering, … the resolution was put forth that … every ethnonational people should receive autonomy in which they run their own affairs. (21)

Quoted in Ira Klein, "English Free Traders and Indian Tariffs, 1874—96," Modern Asian Studies (1971). 5(3), 251–271, note 13.Chapter three: the road to the Oxus, 1864–1873' (pp. 105–48) outlines the Russian conquest of the three primary Central Asian states of Khokand, Bokhara, and Khiva, resulting in the establishment of Russian Turkestan and moving Russia within striking distance of India. Amidst the conquest, complex networks of relations are highlighted between the Central Asian states, British India, and the Ottoman Empire, facilitated in part by a pan-Islamic movement which sometimes worked to one or the other imperial power's favor, and at other times to the potential detriment of both (p. 117). These networks extended into Eastern (later called Chinese) Turkestan with its center at Kashgar where Yakub Beg, taking advantage of the region's destabilization through fallout from the Taiping Rebellion (1850–64), took power in this period only to become a pawn in the Great Game (pp. 133–42). But while 'the political crisis in Chinese Turkestan contributed to the general deterioration of not only Russo-Chinese but also Russo-British relations' (p. 142), it was the Russian conquest of Khiva which, above all, compelled Britain to undertake 'a fundamental rethinking' of the defence of India (p. 142). Up until this time, Britain had been vacillating between '“Masterly Inactivity”' and '“Imbecility”', uncertain as to whether or not they should be seriously concerned by the Russian conquest of Central Asia (pp. 125–33). Most importantly, however, 'the first, fragile seeds of future collaboration had been planted' via 'the Gorchakov-Granville compromise' of 1873, which would not only serve as a reference point for later negotiations (cf. e.g. p. 223), but 'anticipated the forthcoming end' of rivalry between Russia and Britain over Asia (pp. 106, 148). According to the scholar Andrei Znamenski, Soviet Communists of the 1920s aimed to extend their influence over Mongolia and Tibet, using the mythical Buddhist kingdom of Shambhala as a form of propaganda to further this mission, in a sort of "great Bolshevik game". [126] The expedition of Russian symbolist Nicholas Roerich has been put in context of the Great Game due to his interest in Tibet, [164] [165] [166] Although Roerich did not like the Communists, he agreed to help Soviet intelligence and influence operations due to a shared paranoia towards Britain, as well as his goal to form a "Sacred Union of the East" [126] :181–182 Jan Morris states that "Roerich brought the bewilderments of the later Great Game to America" through mysticism movements [167] called Roerichism. Sneh Manajan wrote that the Russian military advances in Central Asia were advocated and executed only by irresponsible Russians or enthusiastic governors of the frontier provinces. [156] Robert Middleton suggested that The Great Game was all a figment of the over-excited imaginations of a few jingoist politicians, military officers and journalists on both sides. [98] The use of the term The Great Game to describe Anglo-Russian rivalry in Central Asia became common only after the Second World War. It was rarely used before that period. [157] Malcolm Yapp proposed that some Britons had used the term "The Great Game" in the late 19th century to describe several different things in relation to its interests in Asia, but the primary concern of British authorities in India was the control of the indigenous population and not preventing a Russian invasion. [158] Whatever other strengths or weaknesses the work may have, Sergeev’s effort remains an impressive undertaking and no belittling of that accomplishment is intended in this critique. His clear strength is Russian and British diplomatic history within the broader context of ‘great power’ relations. To this he makes an important contribution, one from which the reader will richly benefit, just as this reviewer has, provided that the book is read with a critical eye. Japanese Spies in Inner Asia during the Early Twentieth Century* | The Silk Road". edspace.american.edu. Archived from the original on 1 September 2021 . Retrieved 1 September 2021.

Volodarsky, Mikhail (1983). "Persia and the Great Powers, 1856–1869". Middle Eastern Studies. 19 (1): 75–92. doi: 10.1080/00263208308700534. ISSN 0026-3206. JSTOR 4282923. Archived from the original on 24 October 2021 . Retrieved 24 October 2021.a b "Second Afghan War". www.nam.ac.uk. Archived from the original on 2 November 2021 . Retrieved 15 December 2022.